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Abstract
Introduction: Changing the way we make decisions from one environment to
another allows us to maintain optimal decision-making. One way decision-
making may change is how biased one is toward one option or another. Identi-
fying the regions of the brain that underlie the change in bias will allow for a
better understanding of flexible decision-making. Methods: An event-related,
perceptual decision-making task where participants had to detect a picture of
an animal amongst distractors was used during functional magnetic resonance
imaging. Positive and negative financial motivation were used to affect a change
in response bias, and changes in decision-making behavior were quantified
using signal detection theory. Results: Response bias became relatively more
liberal during both positive and negative motivated trials compared to neutral
trials. For both motivational conditions, the larger the liberal shift in bias, the
greater the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) activity. There was no relationship
between individuals’ belief that they used a different strategy and their actual
change in response bias. Conclusions: The present findings suggest that the left
IFG plays a role in adjusting response bias across different decision environ-
ments. This suggests a potential role for the left IFG in flexible decision-
making.
Introduction
Flexibility in the way we make decisions allows us to
adapt to changing environments. In one aspect of percep-
tual decision-making, we make choices about the presence
of stimuli in our environment—for example, cues that
signal reward or danger. Decision theory suggests that
decisions are made through a process whereby sensory
evidence is accumulated and compared against a decision
criterion (Gold and Shadlen 2007; Deco et al. 2013). The
decision criterion is a threshold that determines how
much sensory evidence is needed before a stimulus is
judged to be present. If accumulated sensory evidence
meets the decision criterion, a stimulus is decided to be
present, if not, it is judged to be absent. Changes in the
decision criterion and the corresponding level of sensory
evidence required before a stimulus is judged to be pres-
ent allow for flexible decision-making (Green and Swets
1966; Bogacz et al. 2006; Ratcliff and McKoon 2008). As
behavior, such as approaching a potential reward or
avoiding potential danger, follows from the decisions we
make, flexible decision-making can lead to flexible behav-
ior. For example, in a decision environment where there
is a high probability of reward it would be beneficial to
adopt a decision criterion that is biased toward judging
reward cues as present. However, if a similarly biased
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decision criterion was used in an environment where
there was a low probability of reward, many reward pre-
dicting cues would erroneously be judged to be present
and energy would be needlessly expended pursuing
rewards that do not exist. Flexible decision-making is,
therefore, important for optimizing behavior. Using signal
detection theory, the decision criterion can be quantified
in terms of response bias (how likely an individual will say
a stimulus is present), and the change in response bias
between decision environments can be measured (Green
and Swets 1966; Macmillan and Creelman 2009).
There are several ways that the decision environment
may change including how frequently a stimulus is present
(base rate) or is expected to be present (prior expectation),
the costs and benefits associated with incorrectly and cor-
rectly identifying a stimulus (payoff matrix), and the degree
to which an individual is motivated to identify a stimulus
(motivation). Response bias has been demonstrated to
adapt to all four types of changes in the decision environ-
ment (Henriques et al. 1994; Maddox and Bohil 1998;
Bohil and Maddox 2001; Taylor et al. 2004; Fleming et al.
2010; Forstmann et al. 2010; Summerfield and Koechlin
2010; Reckless et al. 2013). In a rewarded memory task,
Taylor and colleagues (Taylor et al. 2004) demonstrated
that as the payoff matrix changed, participants altered their
response bias to maintain a strategy that optimized the
amount of money that could be won. Motivation similarly
affects response bias. In a recent perceptual decision-mak-
ing study, we reported that when motivated, individuals
adopted a more liberal response bias, that is, they were
more likely to say a target stimulus was present, compared
to when they were relatively less motivated (Reckless et al.
2013). This was in keeping with findings from a verbal rec-
ognition task, where participants adopted a more liberal
response bias when motivated compared to when unmoti-
vated (Henriques et al. 1994).
Both animal electrophysiological and human imaging
studies have identified brain regions involved in accumu-
lating and comparing sensory evidence (Binder et al.
2004; Heekeren et al. 2004; Pleger et al. 2006); however,
the region or regions which adjust the decision criterion
from environment to environment have not been thor-
oughly investigated. Two possible candidate regions
emerge. Heekeren and colleagues (Heekeren et al. 2004,
2006) have suggested that the left superior frontal sulcus
(SFS) is involved in comparing accumulated sensory evi-
dence for different choices. In a face-house discrimination
task, they found that activation in the left SFS varied with
the difference in signal between regions of the brain rep-
resenting face and house evidence. It was further found
that disruption of this region using transcranial magnetic
stimulation affected the rate at which sensory evidence
was integrated as well as decision accuracy (Philiastides
et al. 2011). Given that the left SFS is involved in han-
dling the comparison of sensory evidence, it is possible
that this region is also involved in adjusting how much
evidence is needed before a decision is made—the role of
the decision criterion. Rahnev and colleagues (Rahnev
et al. 2011), while examining the effect of prior expecta-
tions on visual discrimination, found that the more an
individual became biased to a particular choice in
response to a predictive cue, the greater the activation in
the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Reckless and col-
leagues (Reckless et al. 2013) similarly found a relation-
ship between a motivation-induced shift toward a more
liberal response bias and increased left IFG activation.
However, the block design of their study limited the
interpretability of this relationship. While both the left
SFS and IFG appear to be good candidates for modifying
the decision criterion between environments, the relation-
ship between these regions and flexibility in response bias
has not been fully explored.
This study aims to identify brain regions involved in
adjusting response bias and to determine whether individu-
als are aware of any change in response bias from one deci-
sion environment to another. To this effect, different levels
of motivation (positive, negative, and neutral) were used to
affect a change in response bias during a perceptual deci-
sion-making task where participants were asked to detect a
picture of an animal amongst distractors. We proposed two
criteria which had to be met for a region of the brain to be
considered to play a role in response bias. First, there had
to be a relationship between change in activity in the region
from one motivational condition to another and the corre-
sponding change in response bias. Second, regardless of
whether motivation was positive or negative, the relation-
ship between the change in response bias and activation
had to be the same. Further, to examine whether there was
a relationship between the participants’ belief that they
changed bias and their actual change in response bias,
they were asked questions concerning the strategies that
they used in the different motivational conditions. On the
basis of previous findings, we hypothesized that partici-
pants would adopt a more liberal response bias (i.e., would
be more likely to say the stimulus was present) in the posi-
tive and negative motivation conditions compared to the
neutral conditions. We further hypothesized that there
would be a relationship between change in response bias
and activation in the left IFG.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight healthy participants were recruited for the
study in accordance with local ethics committee
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guidelines and provided written informed consent. Prior
to participation, all subjects were screened and were
excluded if they presented with neurological or psychiatric
illness, substance abuse, or MR-incompatibility. Subjects
were paid NOK 300 ($50) for their participation and kept
any additional money they won in the task described
below. Four participants were excluded from analyses
because they were unable to detect signal from noise
(d0 ≤ 0). Analysis was performed using data from the
remaining 24 subjects (mean age  SD = 25.3 
5.6 years; 15 women; one left-handed).
fMRI task
A perceptual decision-making task with three different
motivational conditions (positive, negative, and neutral)
was used to examine the neural correlates of change in
response bias. The experiment was composed of two
scanning sessions; the positive session (positive) included
positive (Pos) and neutral trials (Neut-P), and the nega-
tive session (negative) included negative (Neg) and neu-
tral trials (Neut-N). The inclusion of separate neutral
conditions allowed for the examination of any differential
effect of positive and negative motivation on their neutral
conditions. The task was an event-related, within-subject
design where participants performed 34 trials in each of
the four conditions. Trials within sessions were presented
randomly and the order of sessions was counterbalanced.
Each trial began with a screen depicting six black and
white line drawings (275 msec) (Snodgrass and Vander-
wart 1980)1 (Fig. 1). Participants then viewed a screen
cueing motivational condition and had up to 5 sec to
indicate with a button press using the index finger of one
hand whether one of the six pictures depicted an animal.
The index finger of the other hand was used to indicate if
an animal was not present. Handedness was counterbal-
anced across participants. The motivational cue appeared
after the stimulus to isolate the effect of motivation on
decision behavior and to avoid the confounding effect of
motivation mediated increases in perceptual processing
through mechanisms such as attention (Engelmann and
Pessoa 2007; Engelmann et al. 2009; Pessoa 2009). Posi-
tive motivation trials were cued by a gold coin with
“+10kr” superimposed. Here, 10kr ($1.50) could be won
for correct responses (hits and correct negatives) and no
money would be lost for incorrect responses (misses and
false positives). Negative trials were cued with the same
gold coin with an orange tint and “10kr” superimposed.
On these trials, no money would be won for correct
responses, but 10kr would be lost for incorrect responses.
The tinting of the coin was counterbalanced across partic-
ipants. Neutral trials where no money could be won or
lost were cued by a white disk the same dimensions as
the coin. A jittered delay (3.5  1.5 sec) separated the
participants’ decision from a feedback screen (1750 msec)
which depicted the amount of money obtained on that
particular trial as well as the total amount of money that
had been gained so far. As no money could be won or
lost on neutral trials, only the total amount of money was
displayed on the feedback screen. Individual trials were
separated by a jittered intertrial interval lasting 5  2 sec.
Participants completed a practice version of the task
outside of the scanner to limit learning effects. The prac-
tice task was identical to the experimental task except that
the target stimuli were modes of transportation instead of
animals. The images used in the practice task were not
included in the experimental task.
Apparatus
The paradigm was programmed and controlled using
E-Prime software (version 1.2; Psychology Software Tools,
Inc.; Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Stimuli were presented to the
participants in the scanner using VisualSystem (Nordic-
NeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) and responses were collected
using ResponseGrips (NordicNeuroLab).
Image acquisition
Whole-brain, T2*-weighted, echo-planar images
(TR = 2 sec; TE = 25 msec; FA = 90°) were acquired
using a GE Signa HDx 3T scanner with a standard eight-
channel head coil (General Electric Company; Milwaukee,
WI, USA). Each volume consisted of 36 slices acquired
parallel to the AC-PC plane (sequential acquisition;
3.5 mm thick with a 0.5 mm gap; 260 9 260 mm
in-plane resolution, 64 9 64 matrix). The first three vol-
umes were discarded to allow for magnetization equilib-
rium. A T1-weighted FSPGR structural image
(TR = 7.7 msec, TE = 3.0 msec, flip angle 12°) was
acquired for anatomical comparison. Cushions were
placed around the participants’ head to minimize
movement and earplugs and headphones were used to
minimize noise.
Behavioral analysis
Effect of motivation on decision-making behavior
Discrimination (d0) and response bias (c) were calculated
using signal detection theory (Macmillan and Creelman
2009). Discrimination measures one’s ability to identify a
target stimulus from a nontarget stimulus and is1Copyright 2009 Life Science Associates, Bayport, NY.
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calculated using the inverse z-transformed hit rate (HR)
and false-positive rate (FPR):
d0 ¼ ZðHRÞ  ZðFPRÞ
A d0 score of 0 indicates an inability to discriminate
between stimuli. The better an individual’s discrimination,
the larger the d0 score. Response bias is calculated as:
c ¼ 0:5 ½ZðHRÞ þ ZðFPRÞ
and measures a participant’s willingness to say the target
stimulus is present. A response bias equal to 0 indicates that
a participant is equally likely to say a target or nontarget
stimulus is present. A larger positive score indicates that the
participant is less likely to say the target stimulus is present
(conservative bias), while a large negative score indicates an
increased willingness to say the target stimulus is present
(liberal bias). Given the equal proportion of target and non-
target trials and the neutral payoff matrix in this study, the
mathematically optimal response bias is neutral (c = 0).
Two one-way, repeated-measures ANOVAs were used
to test the effect of motivation on discrimination and
response bias (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version
19.0. Armonk, NY, USA: IBM Corp.). A two-way
(4 9 2), repeated-measures ANOVA was used to examine
the effect of motivation and decision (Yes/No) on the
natural log (ln) transformed response times (RT). Green-
house–Geisser corrections were applied when the assump-
tion of nonsphericity was broken. Significant differences
were identified at P < 0.05. Effect sizes were calculated
using Pearson’s r. Values of r = 0.10, 0.30, and 0.50
reflect small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively
(Cohen 1988).
Where there was a significant difference in response
bias between levels of motivation, the change in response
bias (Dc) was calculated as:
Dc ¼ cMOTIVATED  cNEUTRAL
The more negative Dc, the bigger the shift toward a
more liberal response bias. The more positive Dc, the big-
ger the shift toward a more conservative response bias.
To examine how participants’ belief about their change
in strategy related to their actual change in response bias,
immediately after completing the paradigm and while still
in the scanner, they used the response grips to indicate on a
10-point scale ranging from one to 10 whether they “used a
different strategy when they could win 10kr compared to
when they couldn’t win or lose any money” and whether
they “used a different strategy when they could lose 10kr
compared to when they couldn’t win or lose any money.”
The scale was anchored at each end with the qualifiers “not
at all” and “very much so.” Spearman’s correlations (rs)
were performed between the question scores and the abso-
lute value of the change in response bias (|Dc|). The abso-
lute value of the change in response bias was used because
it gives a measure of the magnitude of the change in
response bias regardless of the direction of the change.
fMRI analysis
Data preprocessing and image analysis were con-
ducted using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8,
Figure 1. Experimental task. Participants viewed six black and white drawings for 275 msec. A decision screen indicating the amount of money
at stake on that trial immediately followed. A gold coin with “+10kr” indicated that 10kr could be won for correct responses and no money
would be lost for incorrect responses. On Neg trials the coin was superimposed with “10kr” and on Neut-P and Neut-N trials the coin was
replaced with a white disk. Participants had up to 5 sec to make their response. A delay screen was presented for a jittered duration of
3.5  1.5 sec immediately following a decision. Upon termination a feedback screen depicting the money obtained on that trial and the total
amount won up to that point was presented (1750 msec). Trials were separated with a jittered ITI of 5  2 sec.
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http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/; Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Motion was assessed
using the TSDiffANA toolbox (http://sourceforge.net/pro-
jects/spmtools/), and no participants were found to have
moved more than 3 mm in any direction. All volumes
were realigned to the first volume (Friston et al. 1994),
and the mean functional and anatomical images were co-
registered. The images were then spatially normalized to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template
(Evans et al. 1992), resampled to a voxel size of
3 9 3 9 3 mm, and smoothed using a 8 mm full-width
at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter using
a cut-off value of 128 sec and the SPM8 AR1 function
were applied.
The data were analyzed by modeling three event types
(stimulus, decision, and feedback) as stick functions con-
volved with a synthetic hemodynamic response function.
The three events were specified for “yes” and for “no”
decisions for each motivational condition. The six motion
parameters estimated during realignment were entered
into the model as multiple regressors. The stimulus and
decision events were combined and contrasted against an
implicit baseline at the first level. These contrast images
were moved up to a second level, random-effects, flexi-
ble–factorial model where the effects of negative
(Neg > Neut-N) and positive (Pos > Neut-P) motivation
as well as any differences between neutral conditions
(Neut-N > Neut-P; Neut-P > Neut-N) were examined.
Significant clusters were identified at pFWE < 0.05 (family-
wise error corrected), k ≥ 10 (extent threshold). Activa-
tions were localized to a particular anatomical region
using the SPM anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2006,
2007).
To identify regions where activity correlated with
change in response bias, a second–level, linear regression
model specifying the positive motivation contrast
images (Pos > Neut-P) and the change in response bias
(Dcpositive) as a covariate was used. A whole-brain analy-
sis identified significant clusters at pFWE < 0.05, k ≥ 10.
As we had a priori interest in the left SFG and IFG, a
region-of-interest (ROI) analysis was also performed. A
mask of these regions created by Nielsen and Hansen
(Nielsen and Hansen 2004) using probability density
estimates from the BrainMap database (Fox and Lancas-
ter 1994) was applied to the contrast image. Small vol-
ume correction using a threshold of pFWE < 0.05, k ≥ 10
was then used to identify significant clusters within the
masked region. A linear regression was also performed
for the negative motivation contrast (Neg > Neut-N)
and (Dcnegative) as a covariate.
Results
Behavioral
Motivation did not significantly affect participants’ ability
to discriminate between target and nontarget stimuli
[F(3,69) = 2.48, P = 0.07] (Table 1, Fig. 2A). It did affect
response bias [F(3,69) = 4.13, P = 0.01]. Pairwise compari-
sons revealed that participants adopted a more liberal
response bias in the positive and in the negative motiva-
tion conditions compared to their respective neutral con-
ditions (mean  SD) [0.08  0.32 vs. 0.25  0.29,
P = 0.03, r = 0.44] and [0.13  0.37 vs. 0.31  0.41,
P = 0.03, r = 0.45] respectively (Table 1, Fig. 2B). On a
10-point scale anchored by “not at all” to “very much so”
participants rated their change in strategy as 3.5 (4.8)
(median [interquartile range]) in the positive session and
3.5 (6.5) in the negative session. There was no significant
correlation between the strength of participants’ belief
that they used a different strategy and the magnitude of
their change in response bias for either positive (rs = 0.24,
P = 0.25) or negative motivation (rs = 0.17, P = 0.44).
Motivation did not have a significant effect on response
time [F(1.21,27.74) = 3.41, P = 0.07], however, decision did
[F(1, 23) = 50.92, P < 0.001, r = 0.83] (Table 1, Fig. 2C).
“Yes” decisions were significantly faster than “no” deci-
sions (974 msec [95% CI 855–1109 msec] vs. 1194 msec
[95% CI 1035–1377 msec]) (Fig. 2D). There was no
interaction between motivation and decision
[F(3,69) = 0.74, P = 0.53].
As there is a known trade-off between speed and accu-
racy in forced choice, perceptual decision-making (Bogacz
et al. 2006, 2010), a post hoc analysis was performed to
investigate the effect difference in response time (RT) for
“yes” and “no” responses had on accuracy. A paired sam-
ple t-test revealed that “yes” decisions resulted in more
correct response than “no” decisions [t(23) = 3.30,
Table 1. Behavioral measures.
Pos Neut-P Neg Neut-N
Response bias (c) 0.08  0.32 0.25  0.29 0.13  0.37 0.31  0.40
d-prime (d0) 1.09  0.45 1.20  0.65 1.19  0.57 1.43  0.55
Response time (msec) 1171  389 1064  339 1260  502 1158  448
Values are reported as mean  standard deviation.
402 ª 2014 The Authors. Brain and Behavior published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Neural Correlates of Flexible Decision-Making G. E. Reckless et al.
P = 0.003, r = 0.57]; (75.8  8.0% [mean  SD] vs.
70.4  7.7%), respectively.
Imaging
Effect of positive and negative motivation
Whole-brain analyses found that positive motivation
(Pos > Neut-P) resulted in significantly greater activation
in the bilateral ventral striatum (VS), right IFG, bilateral
middle occipital gyrus (MOG) compared to its neutral
condition (Table 2). Negative motivation (Neg > Neut-
N) resulted in greater bilateral VS, left ventral tegmental
area, right fusiform gyrus, and left MOG activation when
contrasted with its corresponding neutral condition
(Table 2). There were no significant differences between
the neutral conditions (Neut-N > Neut-P and Neut-
P > Neut-N).
Correlation between change in response bias and
brain activation
Region-of-interest analyses revealed that the shift to a
more liberal response bias in the positive motivation con-
dition (DcPositive) correlated with increased activation in
the left IFG pars triangularis (MNI coordinates: x, y, z:
42, 14, 19; r = 0.67, pFWE < 0.05) (Pos > Neut-P)
(Fig. 3A and B). Similarly, in the negative motivation
condition, increased activation in the left IFG pars triang-
ularis (MNI coordinates: x, y, z: 33, 29, 4; r = 0.62,
pFWE < 0.05) (Neg > Neut-N) correlated with the liberal
(A) (B)
(C)Figure 2. Effect of motivation on
perceptual decision-making behavior. Both
positive and negative motivation
significantly affected response bias (A) with
participants more likely to respond that the
target stimulus was present in the
motivated condition compared to the
neutral condition. There was no effect of
motivation on either detection sensitivity
(B) or response time (C). *P < 0.05.
Table 2. Effect of motivation on BOLD activity: fMRI whole-brain analysis.
Region Laterality x y z
Peak
z-score pFWE
Pos > Neut-P
Ventral striatum Right 9 14 8 5.93 <0.001
Left 9 14 8 4.71 <0.05
Inferior frontal gyrus Right 30 26 14 4.70 <0.05
Middle occipital gyrus Right 30 91 7 7.31 <0.001
Left 18 100 4 6.83 <0.001
Neg > Neut-N
Ventral striatum Left 9 14 8 5.29 <0.005
Right 9 14 5 4.96 <0.01
Ventral tegmental area Left 3 25 11 4.73 <0.05
Fusiform gyrus Right 24 85 8 6.90 <0.001
Middle occipital gyrus Left 21 97 7 6.55 <0.001
Family-wise error correction pFWE < 0.05, k = 10. Only clusters with >10 voxels reported. Anatomical region, hemisphere and coordinates are
based on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) labeling system.
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shift in response bias (DcNegative) (Fig. 3C and D). Whole-
brain analyses did not identify any additional regions.
Discussion
Using response bias as a measure for decision criterion
and altering it by manipulating motivation in a percep-
tual decision-making task, the left IFG was identified as a
possible response bias regulating region. This region met
the two criteria we established a priori: BOLD activity
correlated with the change in bias from the neutral to the
motivated conditions, and this relationship held true
regardless of whether positive or negative motivation
induced the shift in response bias.
In line with previous findings (Henriques et al. 1994;
Reckless et al. 2013), motivation resulted in the adoption
of a more liberal response bias compared to when less
motivated. There was, however, no motivation mediated
increase in detection sensitivity. While the absence of
such a relationship is in keeping with results from a study
using a similar paradigm (Reckless et al. 2013), it is con-
trary to other perceptual decision-making studies that
suggest a positive, linear relationship between motivation
and increased performance (Engelmann and Pessoa 2007;
Engelmann et al. 2009). These studies, however, used a
discrimination task while this study used a detection task.
Still, the absence of a relationship between motivation
and performance draws into question whether the
flexibility in decision-making observed in this study was
actually adaptive. Response bias, however, was mathemat-
ically more optimal in the motivated conditions. This
means that when individuals had the opportunity to win
money or avoid losing money they adopted a response
bias that would most likely allow them to accomplish this
goal. This suggests that the change in response bias was
indeed adaptive.
The present results showed that “yes” decisions were
significantly faster than “no” decisions. Given that there
is a known trade-off between speed and accuracy in
forced-choice, perceptual decisions (Binder et al. 1999;
Huettel et al. 2004; Wenzlaff et al. 2011), and that partici-
pants were biased toward “yes” choices in the motivated
conditions, it was important to establish whether there
was a general change in decision-making strategy between
motivational conditions beyond the motivation-mediated
change in bias. Although faster, “yes” decisions resulted
in significantly more correct responses than “no” deci-
sions. This is contrary to the established trade-off between
speed and accuracy where slower decisions are more accu-
rate than fast decisions (Binder et al. 1999; Huettel et al.
2004; Wenzlaff et al. 2011). The absence of an interaction
between decision type and motivation indicates that “yes”
responses were faster than “no” responses in all condi-
tions. This then excludes a possible confound of a more
general strategy shift on change in response bias and its
corresponding changes in brain activity. It is possible that
(A) (B)
(D)(C)
Figure 3. Correlation between the change
in response bias and activation in the left
IFG. The larger the shift toward a liberal
response bias (Dc), the greater the left IFG
activation for both the Pos compared to
Neut-P (A & B) and Neg compared to
Neut-N (C & D) conditions.
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the faster, “yes” responses reflect immediate identification
of the animal target, while the slower “no” responses are
driven by the continuing search for a target that is not
present. The combined behavioral results suggest that
motivation induced a change in response bias that was
adaptive and that the change in bias was not confounded
by another more general change in strategy.
The IFG met the two criteria proposed a priori—its
activity correlated with the change in bias between moti-
vational conditions, and the relationship held true regard-
less of the valence of motivation that drove the shift in
response bias This region has previously been implicated
in the choice between alternatives (Zhang et al. 2004;
Moss et al. 2005). For example, Zhang and colleagues
(Zhang et al. 2004) found increased activation in the left
IFG when participants viewed a cue that indicated that
they must choose between two sets of letters compared to
when they viewed a cue indicating they did not have to
make a choice. It has also been suggested that the left IFG
is involved in switching between rules that guide choice
selection (Crone et al. 2006; Philipp et al. 2013). During
a task where participants were cued as to which choice
rule to use when observing a subsequent target, Crone
and colleagues (Crone et al. 2006) found that there was
greater left IFG activation during trials that required par-
ticipants to switch to a different choice rule. This study’s
finding that left IFG activation correlated with the change
in response bias for both positive and negative motivation
is in accordance with the region’s previously observed
role in choice selection and rule switching. Response bias
measures the decision criterion (Green and Swets 1966;
Macmillan and Creelman 2009). That is, it is a quantifica-
tion of the rule that determines how a choice is made.
When response bias shifted to a relatively more liberal
bias, that is, the decision criterion changed, increased
activation was observed in the left IFG. This seems to be
in line with the aforementioned findings from Crone and
colleagues (Crone et al. 2006) who observed an increase
in activity in this region when the rule used to make a
choice needed to be changed.
Previous studies investigating the neural correlates of
perceptual decision-making have implicated the left SFS
in the computation of perceptual decisions (Heekeren
et al. 2004, 2006; Pleger et al. 2006; Philiastides et al.
2011). For example, Heekeren and colleagues (Heekeren
et al. 2006) found that activation in the left superior fron-
tal sulcus reflected the comparison of accumulated evi-
dence needed for the discrimination of perceptual stimuli.
When activity in this region was disrupted, the rate of
sensory evidence accumulation decreased and decisions
became less accurate (Philiastides et al. 2011). While the
left SFS may be involved in comparing sensory evidence,
we (Reckless et al. 2013) previously found that a more
ventral region of the frontal cortex, the left IFG may be
involved in adjusting the decision criterion between dif-
ferent decision environments. However, the block design
of that study limited how this relationship could be inter-
preted. The present findings suggest that the left IFG is
indeed involved in adapting the decision criterion. This is
in keeping with findings from Rahnev and colleagues
(Rahnev et al. 2011) who found that individuals who
adjusted their response bias more based on information
from predictive cues had greater activation in the left
IFG. However, one problem that arises when considering
results across perceptual decision-making studies is
whether the perceptual decision-making task was one of
detection or one of discrimination and what decision-
making model was used to evaluate the behavioral and
imaging findings. This study used a detection task and
signal detection theory (SDT). Rahnev and colleagues
(Rahnev et al. 2011), who found a similar relationship
between response bias and activation in the left IFG, used
a discrimination task and SDT. The finding that there is a
relationship between response bias and the left IFG in
both a discrimination and a detection task suggests that
the relationship is independent of the type of perceptual
decision-making task performed.
A limitation of this study was that it used one theory
of decision-making to investigate the neural correlates of
the decision criterion. While the change in response bias
was correlated with the change in activation from the
positive and negative motivation conditions to their
respective neutral conditions, it is unknown whether this
pattern is unique to response bias or whether it can be
observed using other models of perceptual decision-mak-
ing. The drift diffusion model (DDM) (Ratcliff 1978;
Ratcliff and Smith 2004) of perceptual decision-making
has gained in popularity because of its ability to explain
observed trade-offs between speed and accuracy. Unlike
SDT that suggests a single decision-criterion, DDM sug-
gest two criteria—one for each alternative. These criteria
are represented in terms of decision boundaries which,
when bias is neutral, lie an equal distance but on opposite
sides of a point at which evidence accumulation begins.
Here, response bias is modeled as a shift in the starting
point toward one decision boundary and away from the
other. Perceptual decision-making studies that have used
DDM have found that “drift rate,” how fast accumulated
evidence approaches one of the decision boundaries, is
what seems to be driving the activation in the left SFS
(Heekeren et al. 2006; Summerfield et al. 2006; Philias-
tides et al. 2011). However, Mulder and colleagues (Mul-
der et al. 2012), using the DDM, found that when they
separately manipulated prior probability and payoff
matrix in a random dot-motion task, change in bias was
associated with increased left IFG activation. In effect,
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bias toward one decision boundary or another was associ-
ated with left IFG activation. This suggests that the rela-
tionship between the change in bias and the left IFG
activation is not unique to the SDT model of decision-
making. The finding that there is an association between
a change in the decision criterion in both detection and
discrimination studies and that this relationship tran-
scends the model used to investigate it provides converg-
ing evidence that the left IFG is involved in adjusting
decision criterion between different environments.
Conclusions
Flexibility in the way we make decisions allows us to
maintain an optimal choice strategy as the decision envi-
ronment changes. Findings from this study suggest that
the left IFG contributes to this flexibility through its
involvement in adjusting how we bias our choices. Given
that subsequent behavior often follows from present deci-
sions, the left IFG may, to some extent, play a role in
flexible behavior.
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